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The Relationship Between Sociability and 
Household Debt1
MERVE BÜŞRA ALTUNDERE
İstanbul Sabahattin Zaim Üniversitesi
ABSTR ACT
This paper examines the influence of social interaction on household debt with using the 
data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. I investigate whether 
sociability (participation in social activities like charity work, sport club and educational 
course) is related with the tendency of holding debt and the amount of debt held. For my 
total sample consisting of thirteen European countries, I find that sociability has sizeable 
positive effects on both mortgage debt and non-mortgage debt. It shows that sociable 
households are more likely to borrow and have greater amounts conditional on borrowing 
compared to the others. Nevertheless, my country-level findings present a considerable 
variation across countries in their social effects on debt. 
Keywords: Household Finance, Social Interaction, Household Debt, European Debt Crisis
Sosyallik ve Hanehalkı Borçlanması 
Arasındaki İlişki
ÖZ
Bu makalede sosyal ilişkilerin hanehalkı borçlanma davranışlarına olan etkisi ‘Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe’ (Avrupa Sağlık, Yaşlanma ve Emeklilik Anketi) 
verileri kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Bu kapsamda borçlu olma eğiliminin ve sahip olunan 
borç miktarının sosyallik (hayır işi, spor kulübü ve eğitici kurs gibi sosyal aktivitelere 
katılım) ile bir ilişkisinin olup olmadığı araştırılmıştır. Ankette yer alan on üç Avrupa 
ülkesinin verileri birlikte ele alındığında, sosyalliğin hem mortgage borçlarını ve hem de 
mortgage dışı borçlanmaları pozitif olarak etkilediği görülmektedir. Bu durum gösteriyor ki, 
sosyal hanelerin borçlanma olasılıkları diğerlerine kıyasla daha yüksektir ve bu haneler eğer 
borçlularsa genelde daha fazla miktarda borca sahiptirler. Bu sonuçlara rağmen, sosyalliğin 
borçlanmaya tesirine ülkeler düzeyinde ayrı ayrı bakıldığında bazı önemli farklılıkların 
olduğu da tespit edilmiştir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Hanehalkı Finansı, Sosyal Etkileşim, Hanehalkı Borcu, Avrupa Borç 
Krizi
1This paper is a revised version of a chapter in my Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Goethe University 
Frankfurt. It has benefited greatly from comments and suggestions by Michael Haliassos, Mario Padula, 
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, and the seminar participants at Goethe University Frankfurt.
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The role of social interactions in economic context has become an important area of 
research in recent decades. Many researchers have already examined the influence 
of social interaction on various kinds of economic behavior such as consumption, 
labor supply, entrepreneurship, bankruptcy and investment in assets. However, the 
emphasis on debt behavior is still novel in the literature, and this is one of the first 
papers to investigate social influence on debt. 
There are basically two papers exploring the effect of social interaction on debt. In 
one of them, Georgarakos et al. (2014) analyze the Dutch data, and present that higher 
perceived income of peers in society is associated with greater likelihood of obtaining 
loans and more borrowing amounts for both collateralized and consumer loans. In the 
other one, Brown et al. (forthcoming), who use the British data in their analysis, report 
that there is positive relation between social interaction and debt holding, as well as 
asset holding. In my paper, for the first time in the literature, I examine social effect on 
household debt in an international dimension with the data from thirteen European 
countries.
The data used in my estimation come from the second wave of the Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe. This wave of the survey collected data of individuals 
aged fifty and older from fifteen countries. These individuals were interviewed on 
several topics like family relations, health conditions, socio-economic status, and 
financial characteristics. Furthermore, they were asked the questions about their 
social participations and their debt holding levels, which are crucial for my analysis 
because the answers of these questions allow me to construct the measures for social 
interaction and household debt. 
In my analysis, to measure the sociability of households, I construct an indicator 
from their participation in social activities such as voluntary works, training courses, 
sport clubs, and political organizations. Households are classified as sociable if they 
attend one of these social activities and as non-sociable if they do not attend any of 
them. On the other hand, the debt of households is analyzed under two types, mortgage 
debt and non-mortgage debt. Two indicators are constructed for each type of debt, one 
from the holding of debt and the other from the amount of debt held. Afterwards, I 
examine whether sociable households are more probably to take on mortgage debt and 
non-mortgage debt, and whether they borrow larger amounts of these debts. 
My baseline results from pooled estimation of all countries in the sample present 
that the influence of social interaction on debt is positive and significant, controlling 
for a rich set of household characteristics including age, education, work status, 
health, trust, income and wealth, and also for country dummies. In specific, sociable 
households have a 1.6 percentage point higher probability to hold mortgage debt 
and a 2.7 percentage point higher probability to hold non-mortgage debt relative to 
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their non-sociable counterparts. Conditional on holding the relevant type of debt, 
sociable households have 18 percent more mortgage debt and 25 percent more non-
mortgage debt than the non-sociable ones. Moreover, I find this significant positive 
social influence on the probability and the (conditional) amount for both mortgage 
and non-mortgage debt, when the frequency or the diversity of social participation is 
considered in my sociability measure. It is also found that the influence is stronger for 
more frequent and more diversified participations.
This positive impact of sociability on household debt can be through several 
channels. In general, people do not want to discuss their debts with others because of 
shame or status concern; nevertheless, if they have financial problems, then they might 
ask them for advice about taking loans or ask directly for loans. Although debts are 
not observable, people could observe the consumption, incomes or living standards 
of others. Therefore, they may get into debt in order to purchase what is admired 
from others, to match the standards in their social group, or to make conspicuous 
consumption. These are some plausible channels of the social impact on debt. 
The causality of the positive association between sociability and debt might also 
be the reverse; and indebted households might prefer to participate more in social 
activities. Hence, to check the robustness of my results, I look at some possible ways of 
the reverse causality. Financially-straitened households could be more likely to engage 
in activities either to earn money from their engagements, or to get acquainted with 
rich people and borrow from them, or to meet wise people and take financial advice. 
These households could also be more likely to attend educational or training courses 
to enhance their skills for pursuing jobs. I find that my baseline results are quite robust 
against each of these possibilities, which supports that household debt is influenced by 
social interaction.
In my sample, I have thirteen countries from different regions of Europe, with a 
wide variation in sociability practices and debt levels. Therefore, in addition the pooled 
estimation, I explore the relationship between social interaction and household debt 
for each country in the sample. The country-by-country results display heterogeneity 
across countries in their social effects on mortgage debt and non-mortgage debt. There 
is only one country that has significant positive effect of sociability on the tendency 
and the size of both types of debt, which is Germany. Among the other countries, 
sociability has significant effects in Belgium and the Netherlands for mortgage debt, 
and in Sweden, Austria and Czech Republic for non-mortgage debt; whereas the rest 
has no significance at all. 
In recent years, a number of eurozone countries have fallen into the debt crisis one 
after another. These countries have experienced the crisis mainly as a result of their 
high levels of sovereign debt. In this paper, I also investigate whether fiscally troubled 
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countries are more probably to exhibit borrowing behavior affected by sociability. My 
sample contains three of these fiscally troubled countries: Greece, Spain and Italy. The 
data present that these three countries do not have higher levels of household debt 
than the other countries. Besides, the impacts of sociability on mortgage and non-
mortgage debt, contrary to the expectations, are totally insignificant for the fiscally 
troubled group, while those impacts are significant and sizeable for the group of non-
troubled countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature 
on social interaction and household debt, also discusses the possible channels through 
which debt is influenced by sociability. In Section 3, I describe the data and explain the 
indicators of sociability and debt in detail. Section 4 shows the methodology used in 
my analysis of social influence on debt behavior; and Section 5 reports the empirical 
results from the estimations. Section 6 concludes.
LITER ATURE
S ocia l  Interact ion
The interest in social interaction has expanded into many areas of economics 
over the last decades. Social interaction, according to Brock et al. (2001), is the 
interdependencies among the decisions of people that are not mediated by markets or 
enforceable contracts. The beliefs, preferences and constraints faced by an economic 
agent are affected directly by the choices and characteristics of others in society 
(Durlauf et al. 2010). Therefore, many researchers have started to study the role of 
social interaction in explaining economic behavior. 
There is a substantial literature on social influence in many different areas of 
economics and finance, such as consumption (Binder et al. 2001; Allenby et al. 2003), 
entrepreneurial activity (Giannetti et al. 2009), labor market (Grodner et al. 2011; 
Zenou 2013), retirement savings (Duflo et al. 2002; Beshears et al., forthcoming), 
stock market participation (Hong et al. 2004; Brown et al. 2008; Georgarakos et al. 
2011), and bankruptcy (Miller, forthcoming). My paper contributes to this literature 
by exploring the influence of sociability on household debt. 
To the best of my knowledge, there exist two papers analyzing the relationship 
between social interaction and debt holding. They find positive relations with using 
different datasets and different methods. On the one hand, Georgarakos et al. (2014) 
investigate the effect of social interaction on debt behavior for the Dutch population, 
emanating from the perceptions of relative standing. They show that the higher the 
perceived average income in the social circle is, the more the households tend to have 
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debt and borrow larger amounts, which is true for both collateralized and consumer 
(uncollateralized) debt. Besides, this positive effect is stronger for the households who 
perceive themselves poorer than their social circle. On the other hand, Brown et al. 
(forthcoming) investigate the association of social interaction with household finances 
(six types of assets and six types of debt) for the British population, and measures 
social interaction by active club membership. They find that social interaction has 
positive association with not only financial assets but also secured and unsecured 
debt, in terms of both the probability of holding and the amount held. But there are 
differences with respect to the magnitude of the social effects.
In my paper, the influence of social interaction on debt is analyzed in an international 
dimension for thirteen countries from different regions of Europe. In this analysis, 
to proxy the social interaction, following Hong et al. (2004) and Georgarakos et al. 
(2011), I create an index that is based on the participation of households into social 
activities (e.g. charity work, sport club and community organization). Households are 
distinguished between ‘sociable’s who participate in an activity over the last month 
and ‘non-sociable’s who do not participate in any of them. Then, I study whether the 
sociability of households increases their tendency   to borrow and their borrowing 
amounts. 
Social participation might influence the asset holding behavior of households 
through information-sharing, observational-learning or conformity-feeling of such 
behavior (Hong et al. 2004). However, the effect of social participation on their debt 
holdings is less probably to arise from these channels, because debts are usually 
invisible in society. People do not want their debts to be known by the others, so they 
prefer neither to talk about their indebtedness nor to display their debt amounts. 
Hence, the debts of people are mostly unobservable to the others in society. There are 
some other possible ways through which household debt could be influenced by social 
participation. 
When people interact with others in social activities, they generally exhibit, discuss 
and observe (not their debt behavior directly, but) some other economic behaviors 
affecting their debt holdings, such as their consumption, incomes and living standards. 
Therefore, people may make conspicuous consumption so as to signal their wealth 
and to enhance their status in the social group (Veblen 1899). They often incur debts 
for financing (at least some part of) this consumption, since they want to represent 
themselves better than how actually they are and to advance in social ranking 
(Becker et al. 2006). Moreover, people usually try to imitate the spending or living 
standards of their social group (with feeling pressure or desire), which might probably 
lead to borrowing, especially when they perceive their social group to have higher 
wealth or income (Georgarakos et al. 2014). Besides, people may admire some of the 
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consumption of the others around them, and purchase the same things for themselves. 
Their extra purchases may result in taking on debts. These three ways show that social 
comparison could be important for debt behavior. On the other hand, even though 
people do not want to discuss debt issues, they might get information from the others 
about the social norms and values on holding debt; and when they face with financial 
difficulties, they might ask advice from their financially informed friends about how to 
take out formal or informal debts. Thus, information-sharing is still a possible way of 
the social influence on borrowing. In such hard times, people may also directly ask to 
borrow from their wealthy friends. Consequently, the participation in activities could 
increase household debt through some of these channels. 
Household Debt
Demand for household debt arises either in a planned or in an unplanned way. 
According to Lilico (2010), households mostly plan to take up loans in order to smooth 
their consumption over their life-cycles or to make investment in consumer durables 
(like houses and cars) and human capital, whereas they might also take up unplanned 
loans as a result of an unexpected unemployment, a temporary drop in income or a 
sudden additional cost. For these different purposes, households incur different kinds 
of debt to finance their needs: informal debts from their family and friends, mortgages 
and other types of collateralized debts, or uncollateralized consumer debts such as 
private loans, checking account overdrafts and credit card balances (Bertola et al. 
2007).
The factors influencing household debt are studied by many researchers 
theoretically and empirically. Cox et al. (1993), using the U.S. data, present that the 
demand for debt rises until the mid-thirties of household head and then declines 
steadily; besides it increases with permanent earnings and net worth, while decreases 
with current income. Del Rio et al. (2006) examine the determinants of unsecured 
debt for British households, and report that both the probability of having debt and 
the amount borrowed are affected positively by education and income, but negatively 
by retirement. Livingstone et al. (1992) also investigate the U.K. data, and propose 
that socio-demographic factors have relatively small effect on personal debt; instead 
attitudes towards debt play crucial role. Using the Greek data, Mitrakos et al. (2009) 
find the probability of a household having a loan is positively associated with education 
of household head, number of members in employment, income and net wealth. 
Magri (2002) analyzes the determinants of debt in Italy, and shows that income is more 
important factor of debt-market participation than net wealth. He finds that residence 
area is also important; and living in very small municipalities decreases loan demand. 
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Crook (2001) looks at the U.S. data, and reports that demand for debt is positively 
correlated to working head, family size, current income and home ownership; but 
negatively to risk aversion and net worth. Yılmazer et al. (2005), with also using the 
U.S. data, present a negative effect of financial assets on the likelihood of having debt 
and on the amount of debt compared to total assets, and a positive effect of non-
financial assets on those for only secured debt. Furthermore, Lea et al. (1993) present 
that economic conditions strongly affect debt; nevertheless, psychological and social 
factors are also important determinants of debt.
In this paper, I examine whether household debt –the tendency of households 
to hold debt and the outstanding amount of debt held– is influenced by social 
interaction, controlling for all these factors such as age, education, employment, risk 
attitude, residence, income and wealth, with using the data from European countries. 
Moreover, household debt is explored under two subgroups, mortgage and non-
mortgage, because they have different determinants and different properties.
DATA
Sample
My analysis is based on the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE), which is a multi-disciplinary and cross-national survey collecting micro 
data of individuals aged fifty and above, and their spouses or partners. 2  The survey 
contains information upon demographics, socio-economic characteristics, health 
behavior, family and social relations, and financial situation.3 Baseline study of SHARE, 
the first wave, was conducted in 2004-05 to eleven countries from different regions 
in Europe: Central Europe (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, 
and Belgium), Scandinavia (Sweden and Denmark), and the Mediterranean (Spain, 
Italy, and Greece). Israel also joined SHARE as the first country from Middle East and 
provided data in 2005-06. The second wave of the survey was carried out in 2006-07 
2 This paper uses data from SHARE wave 4 release 1.1.1, as of March 28th 2013(DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w4. 
111) or SHARE wave 1 and 2 release 2.6.0, as of November 29 2013 (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w1.260 and 
10. 6103/SHARE.w2.260) or SHARELIFE release 1, as of November 24th 2010 (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.
w3.100). The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through 
the 5th Framework Programme (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality of 
Life), through the 6th Framework Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, 
CIT5- CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through the 7th Framework 
Programme (SHARE-PREP, N° 211909, SHARE-LEAP, N° 227822 and SHARE M4, N° 261982). Ad-
ditional funding from the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 
AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21 AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11 and OGHA 04-064) and the 
German Ministry of Education and Research as well as from various national sources is gratefully ac-
knowledged (see www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institutions).
3 More detailed information can be found in Börch-Supan et al. (2008) and Börch-Supan et al. (2013).  
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in fourteen European countries with three new participants: Czech Republic, Poland 
and Ireland. Israel contributed data to the second wave in 2009-10. The third wave, 
SHARELIFE, was conducted to these countries (excluding Ireland and Israel) in 2008-
09; however, different than the first two waves, its data collection focused on the life 
histories of the respondents. Recently, SHARE released its fourth wave which took 
place in 2011-12 in previous twelve countries (except Greece) and new four ones: 
Estonia, Hungary, Portugal, and Slovenia. 
In my paper, I get the data from Release 2.6.0 of the second wave of SHARE to 
address my question whether social interaction has a significant effect on household 
debt in Europe. Detailed information on debts of the respondents and their social 
participations is available in all waves of SHARE but the third one. I prefer to work 
with the second wave of the survey in my analysis rather than the first one, since it 
comprises more countries and surveys with a larger number of individuals; and 
rather than the fourth one, because its time period (2006-07) enables to investigate 
the behavior of respondents shortly before the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, so in 
a good and stable economy. The second wave of SHARE includes data from 25,036 
households from fifteen countries. But the households with missing information on 
(imputed) debt amounts, social activities and survey weights are excluded. Then, 
my baseline sample becomes 16,919 households from thirteen European countries: 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, 
Spain, Italy, Greece, Czech Republic, and Poland.4
Indicators  of  Household Debt
I examine household debt under two categories, mortgage debt and non-mortgage 
debt; since mortgage debt has different determinants and characteristics than other 
kinds of debts. My debt indicators are obtained from the multiply imputed dataset of 
SHARE; therefore, I have not only the revealed amounts of debts but also the reliable 
multiple guesses for the missing values. Mortgage debt includes all mortgages and 
loans on household’s primary residence; whereas non-mortgage debt involves in all 
other debts of household different than mortgage debt, such as debt on cars, overdue 
bills, debt on credit cards, loan from banks or financial institutions, and debt to 
relatives or friends.
4 My debt indicators are constructed from imputed variables (“hmortv” for mortgage debt and “hliabv” 
for non-mortgage debt); therefore, I exclude the respondents who do not have imputations from baseline 
sample. Ireland is lost during this exclusion. My main sociability indicator is obtained from the ques-
tion of “activities in last month”, and the respondents who have missing information on that question or 
refused to answer or answered as ‘don’t know’ are also dropped from the sample. This paper analyzes the 
effect of sociability on household debt within Europe; thereby Israel is not included in the analysis.
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Table 1 and Table 2 report descriptive statistics on the prevalence and the outstanding 
amounts of mortgage debt and of non-mortgage debt, respectively, for each country in 
my sample. The data is weighted; and all the amounts are in PPP-adjusted Euros. These 
statistics suggest a considerable variation in both the fraction of debt holders and the 
levels of debt holdings within Europe. Especially, in the debt-holding rates, the range of 
variation is much larger for mortgage debt. The heterogeneity in household debt across EU 
members (in terms of absolute volumes, relative to sizes of economies, and compositions) 
is also presented by Lilico (2010) in his paper prepared for European Parliament. 
Table 1 shows that the prevalence of mortgage debt is highest in Denmark, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands and Sweden; and nearly half of their households have mortgages on 
primary residences. The other nine countries in the sample have much lower fractions 
of mortgagers relative to these four countries, about one fourth of them on average. 
The lowest prevalence is in Poland; only 1.4% of its households hold mortgage debt. 
Poland also has the second lowest median (50th perc.) conditional outstanding amount 
in mortgage debt, around 12,000 euro, after Czech Republic, almost 5,000 euro. On the 
other hand, countries with largest fractions also have greatest median debt amounts. 
Particularly, Switzerland has much higher median amount of mortgage debt, around 
113,000 euro, than all the other countries, roughly 39,000 euro in total.
Table 1:  Prevalence and Amounts of Mortgage Debt by Country
Country
Number of 
Observations Prevalence
Conditional Amounts Outstanding
Average 25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc.
Sweden 1,524 44.76 % 51,839 17,412 36,630 65,147
Denmark 987 49.23 % 75,553 28,877 57,668 90,082
Germany 1,251 14.58 % 54,173 16,867 35,803 75,041
Netherlands 1,395 46.10 % 99,253 34,167 72,458 134,163
Belgium 1,608 13.26 % 24,343 4,898 14,795 36,725
France 1,633 12.23 % 46,927 11,873 25,146 51,843
Switzerland 1,064 47.29 % 141,943 53,344 113,110 173,053
Austria 874 9.52 % 35,237 4,809 16,887 49,162
Italy 1,437 6.06 % 44,290 14,429 28,858 60,938
Spain 956 9.29 % 132,301 10,322 25,600 66,306
Greece 1,687 5.59 % 31,294 7,493 19,503 45,991
Czech R. 1,267 5.99 % 11,902 1,997 4,978 21,254
Poland 1,236 1.43 % 18,234 1,453 12,248 29,186
Total 16,919 13.65 % 69,609 14,747 38,851 83,683
Note: Data from SHARE 2006-07. Reported statistics are weighted and corrected for multiple 
imputations. All amounts are in PPP-adjusted Euros.
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Table 2: Prevalence and Amounts of Non-Mortgage Debt by Country
Country
Number of 
Observations Prevalence
Conditional Amounts Outstanding
Average
25th 
perc.
50th perc. 75th perc.
Sweden 1,524 34.34 % 41,127 8,993 26,909 55,360
Denmark 987 25.05 % 52,165 4,946 12,390 39,730
Germany 1,251 14.60 % 33,471 3,303 13,162 34,247
Netherlands 1,395 11.25 % 33,969 2,055 7,823 41,040
Belgium 1,608 14.12 % 21,116 1,096 5,393 15,725
France 1,633 28.43 % 23,655 2,029 6,279 16,622
Switzerland 1,064 11.30 % 187,089 6,810 90,128 171,004
Austria 874 13.52 % 26,460 4,513 13,372 32,272
Italy 1,437 11.69 % 14,536 2,398 5,772 12,505
Spain 956 11.41 % 19,303 3,546 9,400 25,147
Greece 1,687 15.06 % 24,481 2,305 7,236 17,784
Czech R. 1,267 14.37 % 6,552 1,329 3,346 7,601
Poland 1,236 19.80 % 3,473 506 1,456 3,140
Total 16,919 17.03 % 25,958 1,961 6,923 21,082
Note: Data from SHARE 2006-07. Reported statistics are weighted and corrected for 
multiple imputations. All amounts are in PPP-adjusted Euros.
Table 2 presents that the fraction of non-mortgage debt is largest in Sweden –about 
one third of the Swedish are indebted– that is followed by France with 28%, Denmark 
with 25% and Poland with 20% indebted households. The prevalence in other countries 
is between 11% and 15%. The conditional amounts of the non-mortgage debt holding of 
countries are not in line with their fractions. Median conditional outstanding amount 
for entire sample is nearly 7,000 euro. Nevertheless, Switzerland, as in mortgage debt, 
has the greatest median amount  in non-mortgage debt, above 90,000 euro, in spite of 
its small prevalence, 11%. Contrarily, Poland has the lowest median amount, below 
1,500 euro, although it is one of the countries with the highest fraction of households 
holding non-mortgage debt.
Europe has been experiencing a debt crisis in recent years particularly as a result of 
the large budget deficits and huge public debts of some eurozone countries. European 
sovereign debt crisis was triggered by Greece in May 2010; and then followed by other 
countries one after another: Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Southern Cyprus. Besides, 
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the whole Europe has been influenced from this crisis more or less. My sample includes 
three of these countries facing with the recent debt crisis which are Greece, Spain and 
Italy. When a country runs into a debt crisis, it is generally perceived as larger fraction 
of its households also has debt with higher amounts. However, my data shows that this 
perception is not right. It can be explicitly seen from Table 1 and Table 2 that these three 
fiscally-troubled countries have neither larger fractions nor higher conditional median 
amounts of mortgage or non-mortgage debt.5 All in all, unlike their governments, 
households in the countries experiencing this debt crisis are not over-indebted.
INDICATOR OF SO CIAL INTER ACTION
When creating an indicator of social interaction, I use the way similar to the one 
suggested by Hong et al. (2004). They measure the social interaction in their paper 
with the involvement in social activities, and separate households into two categories: 
‘socials’ who interact with their neighbors or attend church, and ‘non-socials’ who 
do not. Therefore, in this paper, I also use the participation of households in social 
activities to construct my sociability indicator; and SHARE provides the necessary 
information with asking the following question which allows for multiple answers: 
“Have you done any of these activities in the last month?” 
The answer categories taken into consideration are6:
“1. Done voluntary or charity work 
4. Attended an educational or training course 
5. Gone to a sport, social or other kind of club 
7. Taken part in a political or community-related organization” 
If a respondent in household has done at least one of these four activities over the 
last month of the question asked, then the household is classified as “sociable”; and 
otherwise, as “non-sociable”.
5 My data on household debt was collected in 2006-07; however, recent European sovereign debt crisis 
has arisen in 2010. Nonetheless, Greece and Italy had the highest debt-to-GDP ratios even in 2007. The 
government gross debt in 2007 is 107.4% of GDP for Greece, 103.3% for Italy, and 36.3% for Spain. (Eu-
rostat, “General Government Gross Debt”, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&ini
t=1&plugin=1&language =en&pcode=tsdde410 (24.4.2014)).
6 In the survey, this question asks seven types of social activities to the respondents. Following Georgara-
kos et al. (2011), three of them are not included in my sociability indicator: “2. Cared for a sick or disabled 
adult”,  “3. Provided help to friends or neighbors” and “6. Taken part in activities of a religious organization 
(church, synagogue, mosque, etc.)”. First two activities are omitted because they may not be related with 
the sociability of households, rather they might capture the households’ financial situation. Moreover, 
the third one is omitted because of the inconsistency in asking the question. In some countries, as a 
result of differences in translation, the question on participation in religious organizations addressed as 
participation in church services, which could result in inconsistency. 
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Table 3: Prevalence of Sociability and Each Social Activity by Country
Participation in Social Activities
Country
Number of 
Observations
Sociability 
Indicator
Voluntary  
or charity 
work
Educational 
or training 
course
Social, sport 
or other  
kind of club
Political or 
community 
organization
Sweden 1,524 57.28 % 26.41 % 26.04 % 32.13 % 5.89 %
Denmark 987 65.17 % 28.84 % 17.82 % 48.92 % 6.45 %
Germany 1,251 43.91 % 18.52 % 7.93 % 32.05 % 4.39 %
Netherlands 1,395 55.32 % 29.55 % 11.45 % 37.49 % 4.65 %
Belgium 1,608 49.70 % 22.74 % 15.04 % 29.14 % 11.30 %
France 1,633 43.43 % 19.65 % 6.45 % 28.81 % 7.81 %
Switzerland 1,064 57.59 % 22.22 % 20.96 % 41.32 % 11.25 %
Austria 874 33.83 % 11.65 % 6.00 % 22.19 % 5.88 %
Italy 1,437 20.51 % 11.53 % 1.88 % 10.18 % 2.84 %
Spain 956 17.51 % 3.57 % 4.98 % 10.79 % 2.68 %
Greece 1,687 17.69 % 2.89 % 3.82 % 9.18 % 4.94 %
Czech R. 1,267 27.06 % 4.40 % 7.84 % 18.59 % 3.59 %
Poland 1,236 8.47 % 2.33 % 2.41 % 3.29 % 2.61 %
Total 16,919 33.88 % 14.43 % 6.91 % 22.16 % 4.82 %
Note: Data from SHARE 2006-07. Reported statistics are weighted. 
Table 3 presents the prevalence of sociability and the participation rates of each of 
the four activities. In the pooled sample, around one third of European households are 
sociable; besides, there is significant heterogeneity in sociability rates among countries, 
but especially among regions. The highest fractions of sociable households exist in 
Scandinavian countries, Denmark (65.2%) and Sweden (57.3%); and then in Central 
European countries, Switzerland (57.6%), the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France 
and Austria (33.8%), respectively. On the other hand, East Europe (Czech Republic and 
Poland) and the Mediterranean (Italy, Spain and Greece) have much lower fractions of 
sociable households. In Mediterranean countries, the sociability rates range between 
17.5% and 20.5%. Although Czech Republic has higher fraction than the Mediterranean 
ones, the lowest fraction of sociable households among all countries is in Poland with 
8.5%. According to Table 3, the prevalence of social participation differs considerably 
across four activities and across countries for each activity. Moreover, regional 
differentiation seems to appear also in these activities, as in sociability indicator. 
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From Table 3, it could be seen that there are remarkable differences in the fractions 
of sociability and in the participation rates of social activities between regions within 
Europe. In addition to this, Mediterranean countries, where people generally consider 
themselves rather sociable, have pretty low sociability levels on the basis of my indicator. 
Hence, a possibility arises that the four activities defining my indicator may capture 
the different extents of social behavior for different countries, and so may not capture 
the same type of sociability for all countries. These activities might be widespread 
among Scandinavian and Central European households, while the Mediterranean and 
East European households might prefer to socialize with other kinds of activities, like 
going to taverns or bars, attending concerts or theaters, and taking part in neighbor 
meetings. Thus, my indicator of social interaction could be culturally biased, so the 
results of my analysis should be considered with the caveat that a cultural bias might 
exist. In spite of all these possibilities, the activities taken into my sociability indicator 
gives a general idea about the social behavior of households.
METHOD
I examine the effect of social interaction on household debt by estimating a number of 
probit and tobit models, in which dependent variables are the decision of holding debt 
and the (log) amount of debt held, respectively. In each model, the relevant debt variable 
is regressed on sociability variable, controlling for a broad set of demographic, socio-
economic, personal and financial characteristics of household, and country dummies. 
In these estimations, I use the multiple imputation method, since my debt indicators 
(and also some of my control variables) are constructed from multiply imputed dataset. 
The coefficients calculated in probit and tobit models cannot be interpreted directly, 
therefore, I estimate and report the average marginal effects for probit models, and 
the average marginal effects conditional on borrowing for tobit models. The estimated 
marginal effects are averaged across households with using calibrated survey weights. 
The object of interest in my estimations as an explanatory variable of debt behavior 
is household sociability, which is a binary variable showing the involvement in social 
activities discussed before: educational/training course, voluntary/charity work, 
political/community organization, and sport/social/other kind of club. Hence, there 
are two kinds of households, and also debtors: sociable and non-sociable. Sociable 
households have at least one member having involved in one (or more) of these social 
activities in the previous month, whereas the members of non-sociable households 
have not involved in any of the activities.7
7 It is assumed that every member of the household share all kinds of information with the other mem-
bers. For example, they come together at dinner table and talk to each other about their days. 
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Household debt, the dependent variable in my analysis, is studied under two types, 
as mentioned above: mortgage debt and non-mortgage debt. I investigate these two 
debt types separately with probit and tobit models. In the probit specifications, the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable taking value 1 if household holds the debt 
type examined and 0 otherwise. Therefore, I explore, with probit regressions, whether 
sociable households are more likely to have mortgage or non-mortgage debts than 
non-sociable ones. In the tobit specifications, the dependent variable is the outstanding 
amount of the debt type under examination, which is a continuous variable but above 
its corner solution (zero debt holding). These continuous debt variables are used 
through the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation which allows for non-linear 
effects of the variables and preserves all observations even the non-positive ones.8 
Thus, with tobit regressions, I explore whether sociable debtors have more mortgage 
debt or non-mortgage debt than their non-sociable counterparts.
When examining the effect of social interaction on household debt, I include a rich 
set of control variables into regressions: demographics, socio-economic status, health 
condition, personal traits and pecuniary characteristics of households, and country 
dummies. Detailed descriptions on these variables and their descriptive statistics for 
total sample are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Sample Summary Statistics
Variable
Number of 
Observations
Mean 
(*Median)
Standard 
Deviation
Age
average age of the respondents 
in household, or age of the 
respondent if he is alone
16,919 65.81 10.62
Couple
=1 if respondent is married or 
lives with his partner
16,838 0.65 0.48
Household Size number of people in household 16,919 2.22 1.17
High School 
Education
=1 if maximum education level 
of the respondents in household 
is high school degree, and none 
of them has any post-secondary 
education
16,919 0.34 0.47
College 
Education
=1 if maximum education level 
of the respondents in household 
is at least post-secondary 
education
16,919 0.25 0.43
8 The formula for the “inverse hyperbolic sine transformation” is: sinh–1(y) In(y2|1)1/2|. It is like a logarith-
mic transformation; but it is also defined for zero and negative values. More information on the IHS 
transformation can be found in Burbidge et al. (1988) and Pence (2006). 
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Retired
=1 if respondents in household 
are retire
16,916 0.55 0.50
Working
=1 if a respondent in household 
is still working
16,916 0.31 0.46
Poor/Fair 
Health
=1 if a respondent in household 
reports that his health is fair or 
poor
16,919 0.49 0.50
Number of 
ADLs
total number of limitations in 
activities of daily living that the 
respondents in household face 
with (ADL: dressing, walking 
across a room, bathing, eating, 
getting in and out bed, using 
the toilet)
16,919 0.33 0.95
Risk Tolerance
=1 if a respondent in household 
reports that he is willing to take 
more than average financial 
risks in expectation of more than 
average returns
16,919 0.04 0.19
Trust
maximum trust level of the 
respondents in household, or 
trust level of the respondent if 
he is alone (trust level is on a 
scale from 0 to 10)
16,779 5.67 2.51
Good Future
=1 if a respondent in household 
feels often that future looks 
good
16,677 0.38 0.49
City =1 if household lives in a big city 16,919 0.15 0.36
Total Income
total income of household from 
all sources
16,919 * 20,087 32,714
Net Financial 
Wealth
total current value of all real 
assets of household minus total 
value of mortgage debt
16,919 * 9,250 159,569
Net Real Wealth
total current value of all financial 
assets of household minus total 
value of non-mortgage debt 
16,919 * 138,783 540,465
Note: Data from SHARE 2006-07. Reported statistics are weighted; besides for relevant variables, 
corrected for multiple imputations. All amounts are in PPP-adjusted Euros. Averages are shown for 
age, household size, number of ADLs, and trust; while medians are reported for total income, net 
financial wealth, and net real wealth. For the remaining variables, the fractions of households having 
that characteristic are presented. 
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Demographic and socio-economic characteristics are likely to affect social 
interaction and debt. As demographics, my regressions contain age (through a second 
order polynomial), marital status and household size. Table 4 presents that, in my 
pooled sample, average age of households is roughly 65.8 –note that the data is from 
respondents fifty and more. 65 percent of households are couple who are married or 
living together with their partners; and average household size is 2.22. On the other 
hand, socio-economic status comprises education levels and labor market status. The 
fraction of households having high school education (at most) is 34 percent; and having 
college education is 25 percent. Other households either do not have any education, 
or have less than high school education or other kind of education. In pooled sample, 
55 percent of households are retired; 31 percent are working; and the rest is inactive 
or unemployed.
Health status of households might have an influence on their debt holdings and 
social participations. Nearly half of the households in total sample report that they 
have poor or fair health; and average number of the limitations in activities of daily 
living is 0.33. Moreover, the engagement in social activities could also be related with 
some personal characteristics such as attitude towards risk, trust level and expectation 
about future, which are probably to influence the indebtedness of households. In my 
sample, only a small fraction of households, 4 percent, have risk tolerance; and average 
level of trust is 5.67 (out of 10). The fraction of households who often feel that the 
future looks good for them is 38 percent.  In addition, I take into account the residence 
area of households that may affect their social interactions and debts. In total sample, 
15 percent of households live in a big city, and others live in suburbs, town or rural.
Pecuniary characteristics are highly associated with the decision of borrowing and 
its amount; and they might also impact social involvement. To control the financial 
situation of households, I include three measures into the regressions: total income, 
net financial wealth and net real wealth –which are used through IHS transformation. 
The median amount of total income is around 20,000 euro; that of net financial wealth 
is roughly 10,000 euro; and that of net real wealth is some less than 140,000 euro. 
My pooled sample includes thirteen European countries with very different social 
and institutional structures. The heterogeneity is also there in their separate descriptive 
statistics. Hence, in addition to the household characteristics, I incorporate country 
dummies into the pooled sample estimations to pick up country specific factors that 
are likely to influence the tendency to have debt and the amount of debt held. These 
factors might be the social norms on indebtedness, the lending practices of banks 
(on credit cards or mortgages), the rules on bankruptcy and the legal environment. 
Besides, these country dummies could pick up the differences in sociability levels 
between countries discussed before.    
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EMPIRICAL RESULT S
In this section of my paper, I initially talk about the baseline empirical results from 
probit and tobit regressions on my total sample. Next, I check the robustness of my 
sociability indicator by focusing on the extensity and the intensity of social relations. 
Afterwards, I discuss the possibility of reverse causality from debt to sociability, so 
apply various specifications to analyze the robustness of the baseline findings. Then, 
I look at the effect of social interaction on debt for each country in my sample with 
separate regressions. Lastly, I explore the fiscally troubled countries as a group to see 
whether the social influence on debt is different for them than for the non-troubled 
group.  
Basel ine  Ef fec ts  of  S ociabi l ity  on Household Debt
In the baseline study, I make my estimations on the pooled sample consisting of data 
from thirteen countries. The debt variable, the decision of indebtedness in probit 
models and the outstanding amount of debt in tobit models, is regressed on sociability 
variable and a number of control variables including household characteristics and 
country dummies. The results are reported for mortgage debt in Table 5 and for 
non-mortgage debt in Table 6. They show the average marginal effects from probit 
regressions and the average marginal effects conditional on debt holding from 
tobit regressions, their (robust) standard errors and significance levels. My baseline 
findings propose a positive, statistically significant and economically important role of 
sociability for both mortgage and non-mortgage debt.  
Table 5 presents the results for mortgage debt. The marginal effect of sociability on 
the probability of having mortgage debt is 0.0155, and its significance is at 1% level. It 
implies that sociable households are 1.6 percentage points more likely to take mortgages 
compared to the others in society. This positive and significant influence of sociability 
continues when the amounts are taken into consideration. The estimated marginal 
effect of sociability on the log amount of mortgage debt conditional on having such 
debt is 0.1773, and it is also significant at 1% level. That is, sociable mortgagors borrow 
roughly 18 percent more than their non-sociable counterparts.
According to Table 5, the estimated impacts of my control variables for mortgage 
debt are generally as anticipated. The signs of their marginal effects and the levels of 
significances are mostly same in probit and tobit regressions; therefore, they are related 
with the likelihood and the conditional amount of mortgage debt in the similar way.
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Table 5: Effect of Sociability on Mortgage Debt
Probit Tobit
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Sociability 0.0155 0.0047 *** 0.1773 0.0547 ***
Age -0.0063 0.0034 * -0.0516 0.0390
Age Squared 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0003
Couple 0.0128 0.0065 ** 0.1306 0.0772 *
Household Size 0.0066 0.0029 ** 0.0876 0.0341 **
High School Education 0.0249 0.0059 *** 0.3229 0.0700 ***
College Education 0.0388 0.0063 *** 0.4936 0.0734 ***
Retired -0.0086 0.0086 -0.1094 0.1018
Working 0.0339 0.0082 *** 0.3784 0.0964 ***
Poor/Fair Health -0.0049 0.0051 -0.0752 0.0592
Number of ADLs 0.0000 0.0038 -0.0051 0.0473
Risk Tolerance 0.0040 0.0083 0.0269 0.0857
Trust 0.0011 0.0010 0.0141 0.0125
Good Future 0.0090 0.0049 * 0.1077 0.0569 *
City -0.0326 0.0072 *** -0.3694 0.0855 ***
Total Income 0.0076 0.0024 *** 0.0915 0.0293 ***
Net Financial Wealth -0.0046 0.0004 *** -0.0514 0.0038 ***
Net Real Wealth 0.0203 0.0019 *** 0.2458 0.0237 ***
Sweden 0.1713 0.0092 *** 2.0299 0.1132 ***
Denmark 0.1817 0.0099 *** 2.1287 0.1153 ***
Netherlands 0.1891 0.0087 *** 2.2760 0.1067 ***
Belgium -0.0170 0.0106 -0.2909 0.1344 **
France -0.0392 0.0113 *** -0.4938 0.1446 ***
Switzerland 0.1789 0.0098 *** 2.2135 0.1165 ***
Austria -0.0353 0.0139 ** -0.5316 0.1788 ***
Italy -0.0867 0.0131 *** -1.1462 0.1702 ***
Spain -0.0278 0.0137 ** -0.3749 0.1765 **
Greece -0.1129 0.0131 *** -1.4688 0.1621 ***
Czech Republic -0.0975 0.0141 *** -1.3688 0.1796 ***
Poland -0.1904 0.0200 *** -2.5844 0.2548 ***
Number of Observations 16,518 16,518
Note: Data from SHARE 2006-07. Dependent variable is mortgage debt. Independent variables are 
sociability; age, age squared, couple, household size, high school education, college education, retired, 
working, poor/fair health, number of ADLs, risk tolerance, trust, good future, city; and the log amounts of 
total income, net financial wealth and net real wealth; and country dummies in comparison to Germany. 
Marginal effect models the probability of having mortgage debt in probit regression, and the log amount 
of mortgage debt conditional on having that debt in tobit regression. Marginal effects are averaged across 
households using survey weights. Multiple imputations are used in the estimations. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.      
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Among demographics, age has significant negative effect only on the probability of 
having mortgage debt, while being couple and household size have positive effects on 
both the likelihood and the outstanding amount. Socio-economic characteristics are 
very influential for mortgage debt. The sizeable influences of high school education, 
college education and working are positive and highly significant. In addition to these, 
living in a big city has strong negative relation with holding mortgages, and expecting 
good future has positive relation. My findings show that pecuniary variables are also 
important determinants of mortgage debt. With high significance levels, income 
and net real wealth are positively associated, and net financial wealth is negatively 
associated. Any other household variables such as trust, risk tolerance, and health 
measures are totally insignificant in the regressions. The marginal effects of country 
dummies represent variation in mortgage debt across countries, and mainly they are 
consistent with the statistics shown in Table 1. 
Table 6 reports the results for non-mortgage debt. The marginal effect of sociability 
is 0.0273 on the likelihood of holding non-mortgage debt, and that has 1% significance 
level. It suggests that sociable households have 2.7 percentage points higher probability 
to incur non-mortgage debt than non-sociable others. I estimate the average marginal 
effect of sociability for the conditional outstanding amount of non-mortgage debt 
as 0.2492, which is statistically significant also at 1% level. This implies that sociable 
households with non-mortgage debt borrow around 25 percent greater amounts than 
the other non-mortgage debtors. From these results, it is explicitly seen that the effect 
of social interaction for non-mortgage debt is much higher than for mortgage debt.
The estimated impacts of control variables on non-mortgage debt, shown in Table 
6, are somewhat different from their impacts on mortgage debt explained above. These 
influences on non-mortgage debt, which are similar for probit and tobit models, are 
mainly as expected and in keeping with the previous researches. As in the mortgage 
debt, financial characteristics have significant association with non-mortgage debt; 
however, the negative marginal effects of net financial wealth are larger, and the positive 
effects of net real wealth are much smaller. Moreover, the probability and the amount 
of holding non-mortgage debt are also positively correlated to both education types 
and working. Unlike the mortgage debt, my results report highly significant positive 
influence of risk tolerance on non-mortgage debt. On the contrary, demographics 
like age, couple and household size become insignificant when non-mortgage debt is 
considered. Living in a city and expecting good future are also no longer significant. 
Additionally, similar to the mortgage debt, being retired, trust level, and health 
status are not significant for non-mortgage debt. The estimated effects of the country 
dummies change as expected and consistently with the reported statistics in Table 2. 
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Table 6: Effect of Sociability on Non-Mortgage Debt
Probit Tobit
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Sociability 0.0273 0.0055 *** 0.2492 0.0589 ***
Age -0.0004 0.0036 0.0361 0.0393
Age Squared -0.0001 0.0000 * -0.0008 0.0003 ***
Couple 0.0097 0.0064 0.1128 0.0705
Household Size 0.0011 0.0026 0.0193 0.0282
High School Education 0.0303 0.0066 *** 0.3164 0.0704 ***
College Education 0.0478 0.0071 *** 0.4895 0.0755 ***
Retired 0.0051 0.0086 0.0361 0.0932
Working 0.0347 0.0089 *** 0.3709 0.0948 ***
Poor/Fair Health 0.0073 0.0054 0.0740 0.0583
Number of ADLs 0.0046 0.0033 0.0563 0.0346
Risk Tolerance 0.0363 0.0096 *** 0.4061 0.1042 ***
Trust -0.0005 0.0010 -0.0078 0.0112
Good Future -0.0016 0.0055 -0.0318 0.0597
City 0.0014 0.0072 0.0128 0.0780
Total Income 0.0087 0.0020 *** 0.0792 0.0203 ***
Net Financial Wealth -0.0206 0.0004 *** -0.1911 0.0026 ***
Net Real Wealth 0.0013 0.0007 ** 0.0148 0.0072 **
Sweden 0.1187 0.0113 *** 1.2282 0.1301 ***
Denmark 0.0780 0.0128 *** 0.8878 0.1417 ***
Netherlands -0.0111 0.0137 -0.1526 0.1528
Belgium 0.0325 0.0119 *** 0.2788 0.1354 **
France 0.1143 0.0116 *** 1.1861 0.1275 ***
Switzerland -0.0307 0.0157 * -0.3123 0.1657 *
Austria -0.0194 0.0145 -0.1563 0.1575
Italy -0.0248 0.0137 * -0.2255 0.1492
Spain -0.0297 0.0156 * -0.2778 0.1704
Greece -0.0882 0.0140 *** -0.7433 0.1436 ***
Czech Republic -0.0547 0.0135 *** -0.5543 0.1460 ***
Poland -0.0450 0.0142 *** -0.3739 0.1507 **
Number of Observations 16,518 16,518
Note: Data from SHARE 2006-07. Dependent variable is non-mortgage debt. Independent variables are 
sociability; age, age squared, couple, household size, high school education, college education, retired, 
working, poor/fair health, number of ADLs, risk tolerance, trust, good future, city; and the log amounts of total 
income, net financial wealth and net real wealth; and country dummies in comparison to Germany. Marginal 
effect models the probability of having non-mortgage debt in probit regression, and the log amount of 
non-mortgage debt conditional on having that debt in tobit regression. Marginal effects are averaged across 
households using survey weights. Multiple imputations are used in the estimations. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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In this paper, when constructing my main sociability measure, I use the 
participation in four kinds of activities asked in the question of the survey; however, 
this question contains also three other answer categories: caring for a sick or disabled 
person, helping to friends or neighbors, and taking part in a religious organization. 
These activities are excluded from my analysis, since the first two might not be directly 
related with the sociability of households and the third one might have inconsistency 
problem. Nonetheless, I examine what if all seven activities are taken into sociability 
measure, and households participating in anyone of these seven activities are called as 
sociable. I find that the significant positive social influence on debt behavior remains 
unchanged, with slightly smaller marginal effects for mortgage debt and pretty larger 
effects for non-mortgage debt, relative to the baseline results.
Ef fec ts  of  ‘Extensive-S ociabi l ity ’  and ‘Intensive-S ociabi l ity ’ 
on Debt
When analyzing the association between social interaction and debt in this paper, 
I produce my (main) sociability indicator through considering the participation of 
households in social activities over the last month. In the first section, my baseline 
results report that sociability has significant positive relationship with the probability of 
holding debt and the amount held. In this section, I investigate whether these relations 
continue to be there when the extensity and the intensity of social participations are 
taken into consideration. Thus, I construct the measures of ‘extensive-sociability’ and 
‘intensive-sociability’ to check the robustness of my sociability indicator. 
Extensive-sociability considers the variation in social interaction. Four types of 
social activities (i.e. charity work, educational course, sport club, and community 
organization) are included in main sociability variable; and the engagement in one 
of them makes households sociable. But there are a large number of households 
engaging in more than one activity, and even some of them in all four activities. 
It could be claimed that the variety of the activities done by households should be 
taken into account when their social interactions are examined. Hence, I create the 
measure of extensive-sociability which is a categorical variable presenting the number 
of different types of social activities participated in, so taking the values between 0 (no 
participation) and 4 (participation in all four types of activities). Then, I re-estimate 
my baseline models with this extensive-sociability measure; and the results are shown 
in Table 7 for mortgage and non-mortgage debt.
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Table 7:  Effect of “Extensive-Sociability” on Debt
Panel A. Mortgage Debt
Probit Tobit
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Extensive-Sociability 0.0112 0.0026 *** 0.1173 0.0288 ***
N 16,518 16,518
Panel B. Non-Mortgage Debt
Probit Tobit
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Extensive-Sociability 0.0157 0.0030 *** 0.1466 0.0336 ***
N 16,518 16,518
Note: Data from SHARE 2006-07. Dependent variable is household debt (either mortgage debt or 
non-mortgage debt). Independent variables are ‘extensive-sociability’; age, age squared, couple, 
household size, high school education, college education, retired, working, poor/fair health, number 
of ADLs, risk tolerance, trust, good future, city; and the log amounts of total income, net financial 
wealth and net real wealth; and country dummies. Marginal effect models the probability of having 
debt in probit regression, and the log amount of debt conditional on having debt in tobit regression. 
Marginal effects are averaged across households using survey weights. Multiple imputations are 
used in the estimations. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. *, **, ***, represent 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
Table 7 shows that extensive-sociability has positive significant influence on both 
types of debt at 1% levels. It is reported in Panel A that households engaging in one 
more different activity have 1.1 percentage points higher probability to have mortgage 
debt; furthermore, the outstanding amount of their mortgage debt is 12 percent higher. 
This positive influence of the diversified participation appears also for non-mortgage 
debt and with larger marginal effects, according to Panel B. The engagement in an 
extra activity increases the likelihood of having non-mortgage debt by1.6 percentage 
points, and the borrowing amount by 15 percent. All in all, my findings from the 
regressions with extensive-sociability present that the participation in social activities 
has positive effect on debt behavior, besides the effect increases with the diversity of 
the participated activities.
Intensive-sociability considers the frequency of social interaction. My main variable 
of sociability treats all the involvements in social activities in the preceding month 
as the same, regardless of how often these activities are involved in. All households 
ranging from those who attend the activities only at once to those who attend every 
day are classified as sociable. However, it could be argued that the intensity of these 
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social attendances is important when sociability of households is investigated. SHARE 
provides the necessary data on intensity through asking the respondents, who replied 
the main question as having taken part in social activities, about the frequency of 
their participations in such activities. I use this information in my analysis to produce 
the measure of intensive-sociability. The question has three answer categories: ‘almost 
daily’, ‘almost every week’, and ‘less often’. Therefore, the measure is constructed as a 
categorical variable that is equal to 3 for daily participation, 2 for weekly participation, 
1 for less-than-weekly participation, and 0 for non-participation. Afterwards, I re-
calculate my regressions with using the intensive-sociability measure; and Table 8 
reports their results.
Table 8: Effect of “Intensive-Sociability” on Debt
Panel A. Mortgage Debt
Probit Tobit
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Intensive-
Sociability
0.0075 0.0022 *** 0.0841 0.025 ***
N 16,516 16,516
Panel B. Non-Mortgage Debt
Probit Tobit
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Intensive-
Sociability
0.0111 0.0025 *** 0.1027 0.0277 ***
N 16,516 16,516
Note: Data from SHARE 2006-07. Dependent variable is household debt (either mortgage debt or 
non-mortgage debt). Independent variables are ‘intensive-sociability’; age, age squared, couple, 
household size, high school education, college education, retired, working, poor/fair health, number 
of ADLs, risk tolerance, trust, good future, city; and the log amounts of total income, net financial 
wealth and net real wealth; and country dummies. Marginal effect models the probability of having 
debt in probit regression, and the log amount of debt conditional on having debt in tobit regression. 
Marginal effects are averaged across households using survey weights. Multiple imputations are used 
in the estimations. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** represent significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
According to Table 8, intensive-sociability influences both mortgage and non-
mortgage debts positively at 1% significance levels. Panel A shows that households 
attending activities more frequently, by one category higher (e.g. daily- instead 
of weekly-participation), are 0.8 percentage points more likely to have mortgage 
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debt; moreover, if they have such debt, then they borrow 8 percent more than their 
counterparts. For non-mortgage debt, the situation is similar with somewhat higher 
marginal effects, as in the extensive-sociability. It is shown in Panel B that the estimated 
marginal effect of intensive-sociability is 1.1 percentage points on the probability of 
holding non-mortgage debt and 10 percent on the amount held. Altogether, these 
results support that debt behavior is influenced by social interactions positively, and 
the influence is larger for more frequent interactions.
Robustness  Check against  the  Poss ibi l ity  
of  Reverse  Causa l ity
In this paper, I examine the effect of social interaction on household debt, and find a 
positive relationship between them. Hence, I suggest that the sociability of households 
increases their likelihood of having debt and their borrowing amounts. This can be 
through some plausible channels as mentioned above: comparing themselves with 
others and so making conspicuous consumption or matching the living standards 
in social group, sharing information such as financial advices about taking debt and 
social norms regarding debt holding, and borrowing directly from relatives. However, 
the causality might be the other way around, and indebted households may engage 
more in social activities with financial expectations. In this section, I examine this 
possibility of reverse causality. 
When people get into financial trouble, they may ask their rich friends for loan, or 
they may ask their knowledgeable friends for financial advice. I suggest that sociable 
households are more likely to have rich or knowledgeable friends, and they are more 
likely to get a direct loan or to take advice about how to get a loan; thus sociability 
of households increases their debt holdings. However, this channel could be reverse; 
and financially troubled households might particularly engage in social activities to 
be friends with someone who lends money or who gives financial information to 
them. In the survey, five possible motivations for social participation were asked to 
the respondents who had taken part in activities: ‘to meet other people’, ‘to contribute 
something useful’, ‘because I am needed’, ‘to earn money’ and ‘to use my skills or to 
keep fit’. Their answers display that there are a great number of households attending 
the activities in my analysis for meeting people. This motivation might stand for  not 
only the desire to make friends and socialize but also the aim to become acquainted 
with wealthy or financially informed people. To eliminate the possible effect of the 
latter, I make my estimations with an additional control variable that represents the 
participation in social activities so as to meet other people. The effects of my sociability 
indicator are found to be quite similar –just slightly greater– with my baseline 
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estimations. These results imply that household debt is positively related with social 
interaction even if these interactions are done with motives different than meeting 
people.
Some people are in the employ of social organizations, and make money with 
involving in social activities. The responses of the question about the motivations 
present that there are a number of involvements in the activities in order to earn 
money. These respondents might be the ones facing with financial difficulties, and also 
having debts. Thus, indebtedness might contribute positively to participation in social 
activities, which infers reverse causality. The fraction of these households is small; 
nevertheless, to rule out this possibility, I re-estimate my baseline models but include 
one more variable which controls for this ‘earning money’ motivation. The estimated 
effects of sociability stay nearly the same for both mortgage and non-mortgage debt. 
This indicates that the motivation of making money does not have much influence on 
the effect of sociability for household debt.
My sociability indicator is based on four kinds of social activities, and one of them is 
educational or training course. It could be conceivable that financially straitened people 
are more probably to attend these courses compared to the others in society; because 
they might want to enhance their abilities to find, to keep, or to improve their jobs. This 
could result in a positive relationship between social interaction and household debt, 
but then the causality would be in the opposite direction of my main argument. For 
this reason, I re-calculate my probit and tobit regressions with a sociability indicator 
depending on other three activities, and find that the positive significant influence of 
sociability remains on both mortgage debt and non-mortgage debt with somewhat 
smaller marginal effects. All the same, these findings support the main argument that 
social interaction increases the probability to have debt and the conditional amount 
of debt outstanding.
Ef fec ts  of  S ociabi l ity  on Debt  for  Each C ountr y
My baseline analysis is based on a pooled sample that includes data from thirteen 
European countries, and these countries have very different sociability levels and 
borrowing practices. The results from the pooled estimation suggest significant 
positive social influence on debt behavior. In these estimations, all coefficients are 
forced to be the same across all countries, although ‘country dummies’ are included 
into the regressions in order to capture the country level differences. Therefore, I also 
examine the influence of sociability on mortgage and non-mortgage debt for each 
country separately, with the models used for pooled sample (except country dummies). 
In these country-level estimations, the coefficients are determined by the data of the 
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relevant country, thereby other countries have no impact on them. Country-level 
results are summarized in Table 9 for mortgage debt and in Table 10 for non-mortgage 
debt. Tables display that the effect of sociability varies substantially among countries 
and between types of debt. 
Table 9 shows that sociability has significant positive effect on mortgage debt for 
three countries in sample: Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The estimated 
marginal effects of sociability in these countries are much greater than the effects in 
the total sample for both the probability and the amount of mortgage debt. Sociable 
households are 6 percentage points more likely to take on mortgage debt in the 
Netherlands, 3.8 percentage points more likely in Germany, and 3 percentage points 
more likely in Belgium. Also, sociable households having mortgages borrow 65 percent 
more than their non-sociable counterparts in the Netherlands,  54 percent more in 
Germany, and 38 percent more in Belgium. 
Table 9: Effect of Sociability on Mortgage Debt for Each Country 
Probit Tobit
N
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Sweden 1,491 0.0090 0.0229 0.0563 0.2283
Denmark 958 -0.0350 0.0304 -0.3561 0.2994
Germany 1,223 0.0376 0.0197 * 0.5352 0.2745 *
Netherlands 1,356 0.0602 0.0219 *** 0.6529 0.2484 ***
Belgium 1,583 0.0296 0.0157 * 0.3830 0.1900 **
France 1,528 0.0190 0.0166 0.2878 0.2444
Switzerland 1,057 0.0169 0.0280 0.1454 0.3013
Austria 864 0.0074 0.0187 0.1100 0.3171
Italy 1,428 -0.0072 0.0143 -0.1895 0.3724
Spain 924 -0.0038 0.0230 -0.0072 0.3762
Greece 1,649 0.0162 0.0108 0.3223 0.2336
Czech R. 1,252 0.0105 0.0147 0.2378 0.3276
Poland 1,205 -0.0060 0.0076 -0.3194 0.3701
Note: Data from SHARE 2006-07. Estimates of sociability are reported for each country in the sample. 
Dependent variable is mortgage debt. Independent variables are sociability; age, age squared, couple, 
household size, high school education, college education, retired, working, poor/fair health, number of ADLs, 
risk tolerance, trust, good future, city; and the log amounts of total income, net financial wealth and net real 
wealth. (In probit model of Spain, risk tolerance is not included in analysis because of sample variation across 
imputations). Marginal effect models the probability of having mortgage debt in probit regression, and the log 
amount of mortgage debt conditional on having that debt in tobit regression. Marginal effects are averaged 
across households using survey weights. Multiple imputations are used in the estimations. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 10 reports that the social effect on non-mortgage debt is positive and 
significant in four countries which are Sweden, Germany, Austria and Czech Republic. 
The size of the marginal effects of sociability is pretty large in these countries compared 
to their size in the whole sample, as in the case of mortgage debt. The participation in 
social activities increases the probability of holding non-mortgage debt by 6 percentage 
points in Czech Republic, by 5.4 percentage points in Germany, by 5 percentage points 
in Sweden, and by 3.8 percentage points in Austria. Besides, conditional on non-
mortgage debt holding, social participation is associated with a 66 percent rise in the 
amount borrowed for Germany and Czech Republic, a 50 percent rise for Sweden, and 
a 44 percent rise for Austria.
Table 10: Effect of Sociability on Non-Mortgage Debt for Each Country
Probit Tobit
N
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Sweden 1,491 0.0498 0.0202 ** 0.4986 0.2138 **
Denmark 958 0.0385 0.0253 0.2549 0.2476
Germany 1,223 0.0537 0.0188 *** 0.6583 0.2323 ***
Netherlands 1,356 0.0190 0.0156 0.2818 0.2285
Belgium 1,583 -0.0004 0.0154 -0.0113 0.1767
France 1,528 0.0191 0.0206 0.0805 0.1793
Switzerland 1,057 -0.0123 0.0136 -0.1732 0.2178
Austria 864 0.0380 0.0177 ** 0.4384 0.2500 *
Italy 1,428 -0.0028 0.0180 -0.0718 0.2192
Spain 924 0.0085 0.0205 0.1763 0.2700
Greece 1,649 0.0248 0.0190 0.2605 0.2113
Czech R. 1,252 0.0603 0.0188 *** 0.6568 0.2143 ***
Poland 1,205 0.0464 0.0424 0.4129 0.3676
Note: Data from SHARE 2006-07. Estimates of sociability are reported for each country in the sample. 
Dependent variable is non-mortgage debt. Independent variables are sociability; age, age squared, 
couple, household size, high school education, college education, retired, working, poor/fair health, 
number of ADLs, risk tolerance, trust, good future, city; and the log amounts of total income, net 
financial wealth and net real wealth. Marginal effect models the probability of having non-mortgage 
debt in probit regression, and the log amount of non-mortgage debt conditional on having that debt 
in tobit regression. Marginal effects are averaged across households using survey weights. Multiple 
imputations are used in the estimations. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.      
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All in all, country-level results present a remarkable variation in the influence of 
social interaction on debt across European countries. In my sample, six countries have 
significant positive effects at different levels on mortgage and/or non-mortgage debts, 
whereas the other seven countries have no significant effect (and some of them have even 
negative sign). It is seen that although the pooled estimation shows highly significant 
positive social impact on household debt, the country-by-country estimations could 
not find such impacts in many of the countries. This might be somewhat as a result 
of having small number of observations when analyzing each country individually. In 
addition to this, debt holding behavior is not widespread in general; and also some 
of my countries have very low fraction of debt holders, especially for mortgage debt. 
Hence, finding a significant relation in these countries is hardly possible. What is more, 
the heterogeneity in the estimated social effects among the countries may result from 
the definition of sociability in my analysis, which might capture the different extents 
of social interaction in different countries, as discussed above. Taking everything into 
consideration, it can be argued that participation in social activities has an important 
positive association, maybe not with both types of debt for all the countries but, with 
either type of debt in some countries.  
Ef fec ts  of  S ociabi l ity  on Debt  for  Fisca l ly-Troubled C ountr ies 
The ongoing sovereign debt crisis has shaken the European countries one-by-one. 
It started with fiscal trouble in Greece; and then spread to Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
Italy and Southern Cyprus. These countries ran into debt crisis particularly as a result 
of the unsustainable levels of their sovereign debt. My main interest in this paper 
is household debt (borrowed by people in the country) rather than sovereign debt 
(borrowed by government of that country), but still they could be somehow correlated. 
For this reason, I investigate the households of fiscally-troubled countries separately 
to observe whether the effect of social interaction on borrowing behavior is larger for 
them than for the households of non-troubled countries. 
In my sample, there are three countries facing with this recent debt crisis: Greece, 
Italy and Spain. In spite of their high levels of sovereign debt, these countries have 
neither larger fractions nor greater amounts of household debt relative to the other 
countries in the sample, as presented before. When social effect on household debt is 
considered, Table 11 shows that the group of fiscally-troubled countries has entirely 
insignificant effects, as opposed to the non-troubled group which has significant 
positive effects at 1% levels. It is reported, for non-troubled countries, in Panel A that 
the influence of sociability is nearly the same with pooled estimation on mortgage debt; 
and in Panel B that it is relatively higher on non-mortgage debt. For troubled countries, 
sociability has rather small marginal effects (mostly) and quite large standard errors, 
thus insignificant influences on both mortgage and non-mortgage debt. 
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It is easily seen from the results that there is a clear difference between fiscally-
troubled and non-troubled countries in their social effects on household debt. In 
my sample, all three of the countries experiencing sovereign debt crisis are from 
Mediterranean region of Europe. Hence, this split between two groups might be related 
not only with debt crisis but also with regional differences. If the other countries in 
crisis are also included in the estimation, then these results might change; but I have 
no data on those countries. On the other hand, it is both possible for these fiscally-
troubled countries that sociability has weaker influence on debt and that sociability is 
not precisely estimated by the social activities in my analysis because of the cultural 
and institutional differences with the other (non-Mediterranean) countries. However, 
as shown in the country-level results, some of these other countries also have 
insignificant effects on both types of debt. Consequently, it could be suggested that 
social participation (in the activities analyzed) does not have significant relationship 
with household debt for three fiscally-troubled Mediterranean countries of my sample, 
contrary to the other countries that are non-troubled and also non-Mediterranean.
Table 11: Effect of Sociability on Debt for Fiscally-Troubled Countries and Non-
Troubled Countries 
Panel A. Mortgage Debt
Probit Tobit
N
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Fiscally-Troubled 
Countries
4,001 0.0092 0.0095 0.1940 0.1963
Non-Troubled 
Countries
12,517 0.0168 0.0056 *** 0.1795 0.0604 ***
Panel B. Non-Mortgage Debt
Probit Tobit
N
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Marginal 
Effect
Standard 
Error
Fiscally-Troubled 
Countries
4,001 0.0142 0.0110 0.1672 0.1312
Non-Troubled 
Countries 
12,517 0.0321 0.0067 *** 0.2775 0.0688 ***
Note: Data from SHARE 2006-07. Fiscally-troubled countries are Greece, Italy and Spain; and non-
troubled countries are the other countries in sample. For each group, the estimates of sociability 
are reported. Dependent variable is household debt (either mortgage or non-mortgage debt). 
Independent variables are sociability; age, age squared, couple, household size, high school 
education, college education, retired, working, poor/fair health, number of ADLs, risk tolerance, 
trust, good future, city; and the log amounts of total income, net financial wealth and net real wealth. 
Marginal effect models the probability of having debt in probit regression, and the log amount of 
debt conditional on having debt in tobit regression. Marginal effects are averaged across households 
using survey weights. Multiple imputations are used in the estimations. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.      
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C ONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have examined the influence of social interaction on the tendency to 
have debt and on the amount of debt conditional on having such debt, with using 
the data from thirteen European countries which was collected in the second wave 
of SHARE. The data allow me to construct the sociability indicator that is proxied by 
the participation of households in social activities like voluntary works, educational 
courses, sport clubs, and political organizations; and to create the debt indicator which 
is investigated under two categories, mortgage debt and non-mortgage debt. 
My findings from the pooled estimation show that social interaction has 
significant and sizeable positive effects on debt, controlling for a number of household 
characteristics such  as demographics, socio-economic status, personality traits and 
financial resources, and also country dummies. These findings indicate that, for both 
mortgage and non-mortgage debts, sociable households (who engaged in activities at 
least once in the previous month) are more likely to participate in debt and have larger 
amounts of debt conditional on such participation compared to their non-sociable 
counterparts. Furthermore, the effect of sociability on both types of debt remains 
positive and significant when the variety and the frequency of social engagements are 
also taken into consideration. Social effect seems to be stronger for more varied and 
more frequent engagements. 
My pooled sample consists of thirteen countries which exhibit substantial 
heterogeneity in sociability rates and household debt levels. Hence, I also analyze the 
relationship between sociability and household debt for each country separately. The 
country level results show that the influence of sociability is mixed and depends on the 
kinds of debt, types of model and country considered. Among all countries, Germany 
is the only one having significant positive relation in all the conditions. Besides, 
sociability is significantly related to mortgage debt in two other countries, Belgium 
and the Netherlands; and to non-mortgage debt in three other countries, Sweden, 
Austria and Czech Republic. 
As a final point, I look at the countries experiencing fiscal trouble during the recent 
debt crisis in Europe. My sample includes three of them, which are Greece, Spain and 
Italy. Unlike their sovereign debt levels, the fractions and sizes of household debt in 
these countries are not high relative to those in the other countries. Nevertheless, the 
estimated social effects on debt are different for fiscally troubled and non-troubled 
groups, but not as anticipated. In the group of fiscally troubled countries, the effects of 
sociability are insignificant for both mortgage and non-mortgage debts; whereas such 
effects are significant with large magnitudes in the group of other countries.
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